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Ethical Problems in Advising
Migratory Divorce
By PB=u ADAms* and STPHmN ADAMS *
M R . LAWYER, my husband and I have relied on you in our
business matters all these years, but now we really need help. We
can't keep this up any longer. Sure, we've tried and tried, but we
both know the party's over. We've both got to get out. What do we
have to do to bury this thing decently as soon as we can-and keep it
quiet? Jack and I can't wait a year to get married; that's asking too
much, especially with four kids. Can you arrange for me to go to
Reno to get it over with in six weeks? Or is there any place we can
get it done even quicker?"
What answers may the California lawyer give his client that are
consistent with his oath as an attorney? The "safe" answers seem
easy enough-either decline the case entirely, or refer the wife to
Nevada counsel, or insist on getting her a California decree and noth-
ing else. But will any of these answers really help this family? The
first two may expose them to the risk of ultimate invalidity of the
divorce decree, while leaving up in the air the all-important effects
of the divorce on the future custody and support of the children, the
wife's support rights, as well as property agreements and tax arrange-
ments. On the other hand, insisting upon a rigid observance of Cali-
fornia's one year waiting period may be emotionally and socially un-
acceptable, and a California decree is often almost impossible to keep
from the press.'
Either of these extremes-declining the case or insisting on a Cali-
fornia decree alone-would unquestionably be "ethical."2 But what
about the middle road? Can the lawyer help to arrange an out-of-state
divorce, knowing the parties expect to return to California as quickly
as possible? Are there any facts which the California lawyer might
discover in the course of the case which he must be prepared to dis-
* LL.B., 1938, Hastings College of Law; member, San Francisco Bar. The authors
wish to acknowledge the generous and valuable advice of Professor Albert A. Ehrenz-
weig, Walter Perry Johnson Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley
and the assistance of Terrance A. Callan of the HAsTINGs LAw JouRNAL.
** A.B., 1961, Reed College; LL.B., 1964, University of California at Berkeley.
1 See Groves, Migratory Divorce, 2 LAw & Coanrr,. PROB. 293, 298 (1935).
2 See SPELL N, SuccEssFuL MANAGEMENT OF MATRimoNAl CASES 287 (1954).
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close to the California courts in any later litigation over divorce,
custody, support, or probate, even against his client's wishes? There
is no clear answer to these ethical problems in the United States today,
and the only California case discussing them is quite unsettling to the
California lawyer who assumes that his usual adversary ethics can
carry him through any matrimonial hassle.
We propose in this paper, first, to review briefly the current
dilemma of "state interest!' vs. "party autonomy" in the substantive
law of American migratory divorce;4 second, to review the opinions
of courts and bar committees concerning the lawyer's duty in migratory
divorce cases; third, to consider the only California case directly dis-
cussing the ethics of migratory divorce, Griffith v. State Bar,5 and its
implications for California lawyers in the light of our law of divorce
jurisdiction; fourth, to re-examine the present law in terms of family
law practice; and finally, to tender some conclusions concerning a
modern, workable, yet honorable code of ethics for the California
family lawyer.
The discussion will focus on the ethical responsibility of the Cali-
fornia lawyer in dealing with the California incidents of divorce
decrees obtained in other jurisdictions by California clients. These
incidents may be a later (or concurrent) matrimonial suit in California
in which the jurisdiction of the foreign court to grant a divorce may
be attacked, a later suit for support under the doctrine of divisible
divorce, a suit for enforcement of support from a foreign state under
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,6 or even a bigamy
prosecution. 7
3 These terms are suggested in EHNzwEIG, CoNruar oF LAws § 71, at 236
(1962) [hereinafter cited as EHmBEiZE], and we use them to describe the clash
between a state's asserted interest "in limiting divorces to deserving spouses" and the
spouses' desire to decide for themselves whether to continue their marriage.
4 We may define migratory divorce as divorce sought by persons "whose change of
residence has been motivated by the desire to obtain a divorce under more liberal leg-
islation than that enforced in their former domicil." Groves, Migratory Divorce, 2 LAw &
CoNTrrN. PfoB. 293, 294 (1935). Justice Frankfurter has referred to these clients as
"permanent residents who leave the State to change their spouses rather than to change
their homes . . . ." Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 361 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
We will use the term "divorcing court" to refer to the out-of-state court rendering the
decree, and "home state" to refer to the state of the spouses' usual residence.,
540 Cal. 2d 470, 254 P.2d 22 (1953).
6 CAL. CODE Civ. Poc. §§ 1650-92.
7 This paper discusses only the ethical problems incident to migratory divorce. In
most states there are also important problems of divorce ethics raised by the defenses of
collusion and recrimination. For discussion of the defendant's lawyer's "duty" to raise
these defenses, or of the plaintiff's lawyer's "duty" to present to the divorce court even
those facts which would bar his client's suit, see Drinker, Problems of Professional Ethics
"State Interest" v. "Party Autonomy"
Unlike Baron Turton's view of the law of real property succession,
the law of divorce jurisdiction has never been clear and certain. In the
scant one hundred years since legislation has made available divorce
through court action, there have been few signs of a systematic pattern
emerging. For present purposes we can distinguish four basic types
of migratory divorces: "participating" divorces, ex parte divorces, mail-
order divorces, and extranational divorces. Several recent Supreme
Court decisions have made it clear that vastly different consequences
ensue from these differing types of divorce; the ethical responsibilities
of counsel for the parties vary correspondingly.
Under current case law, the simplest situation is the "participating"
divorce. The defending party, as well as the plaintiff, appears in the
foreign (divorcing) court and participates in that court's determina-
tion of its own jurisdiction. The divorcing court always has jurisdiction
to determine its own jurisdiction,8 and the principles of res judicata
prevent a "participating" defendant from relitigating the issue of the
divorcing court's jurisdiction. In 1948 the Supreme Court held in
Sherrer v. Sherrer? that where the defendant has participated such a
finding of jurisdiction is entitled to full faith and credit,10 thus con-
stitutionally barring the defendant from relitigating it."
Under the Sherrer doctrine, the parties to a "participating" divorce
in Matrimonial Litigation, 66 HAv. L. REv. 443 (1953), and Note, The Role of the
Lawyer in Divorce: Some Ethical Problems, 21 U. Prrr. L. REv. 720, 727-30 (1960);
2 THE CALiFORNIA Fm.Iy LAwym § 32.31 (1963) [hereinafter cited as FAmILy
LAwYER]. See also In re Backes, 16 N.J. 430, 109 A.2d 273 (1954), for an especially
fearsome application of these rules by a conservative court.
8 See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 51 Cal. 2d 244, 331 P.2d 628 (1958); 1 Wnrxn,
CALFonm PNocxnun 422-23 (1954).
9 334 U.S. 343 (1947).
10 The Sherrer doctrine is limited to interstate divorce, since no full faith and credit
need be -given to divorce decrees of foreign countries. States are still free to invoke
comity, res judicata, or estoppel to bar an attack on a foreign country divorce. Emamx-
zwEIG § 73. California has greatly extended the effect of Sherrer by use of estoppel.
Barber v. Barber, 51 Cal. 2d 244, 331 P.2d 628 (1958); 2 Fm.vmy LAwYER § 32.10;
Comment, 4 HAsTmGs L.J. 37 (1952); Comment, 22 So. CAL. L. REv. 155 (1949). On
what constitutes "participating," see 2 FAm.my LIAwxm § 32.12.
1 Sherrer held that the requirement of full faith and credit bars a defendant from
collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the court of a sister
state where (1) the defendant participates in the divorce proceedings, (2) defendant
has an opportunity to contest the jurisdiction, and (3) the decree is not susceptible to
collateral attack in the court of the state which rendered the decree. Johnson v. Muel-
berger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951), extended this bar to the daughter of a first wife, who
wanted to attack the husband's divorce from the second wife in order to cut off the third
wife's statutory share of the estate. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951), extended the
principle to "strangers to the decree."
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have an unchallengable decree; it would appear that there is no ethical
impropriety in helping them to obtain such a decree. But it is important
to keep in mind that Sherrer did not hold that all "participating"
divorces are valid, but only that participants cannot later challenge
them. Such divorces may perhaps be assailable under rare circum-
stances (as in a bigamy prosecution in the home state) so that the
lawyer, in weighing his ethical responsibilities, may have to consider
whether participation completely relieves him of complications raised
by the more vulnerable ex parte and mail-order decrees.
In an ex parte divorce, only one spouse appears in the divorcing
jurisdiction, and the defendant is served constructively.12 In the lead-
ing ex parte divorce cases, Williams v. North Carolina3 (Williams I)
and Williams v. North Carolina'4 (Williams II), the Supreme Court
held that the full faith and credit clause requires each state to accept
sister state ex parte decrees as valid only if the home state finds that
the divorcing court had jurisdiction over the parties.'5 It is important
to keep in mind that the Supreme Court did not rule that no state
could recognize foreign ex parte decrees, and the decision did not
affect the general presumption that a foreign decree valid on its face
is valid until declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction.16
California has accepted the invitation of the second Williams case
in which the Supreme Court permitted North Carolina to re-examine
Nevada's jurisdictional finding. The California courts will review the
jurisdictional findings of sister state courts in ex parte proceedings to
12 Frequently, the plaintiff will have moved to the divorcing state with a genuine
intention to stay there. These cases are omitted from our discussion here, since we are
limiting "migratory divorce" to divorce involving a trip away followed soon after by
return ' home." See note 4 supra.
13317 U.S. 287 (1942) (assuming plaintiff spouse was properly domiciled in
Nevada, North Carolina required to give the ex parte Nevada decree full faith and credit
as a defense to a bigamy prosecution).
14325 U.S. 226 (1944) (North Carolina allowed to re-examine Nevada's domicile
finding in order to convict petitioner of bigamy, the Court leaving open what law would
govern the re-examination).
15 It may be that the Supreme Court will lay down a constitutional test of domicile,
but until it does so, Williams 11 appears to allow states to use their own test in passing
upon the ex parte divorcing court's jurisdiction. See Kopasz v. Kopasz, 107 Cal. App.
2d 308, 237 P.2d 284 (1951) (California law alone considered). The court added this
warning in Williams 1I: "The challenged judgment must, however, satisfy our scrutiny
that the reciprocal duty of respect owed by the States to one another's adjudications has
been fairly discharged, and has not been evaded under the guise of finding an absence of
domicile and therefore a want of power in the court rendering the judgment." 325 U.S.
at 233.
16 The Williams II opinion stated that "the burden of undermining the verity which
the Nevada decree imports rests heavily upon the assailant." 326 U.S. at 233. See Rice
v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949). See also CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1963 (16)-(18), (33).
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decide whether they are entitled to full faith and credit.17 Therefore,
the California lawyer must be aware that the defendant may collater-
ally attack these ex parte decrees in our courts. This vulnerability may
lead to ethical restrictions upon the affirmative use he may make of
a foreign decree, even if it is valid on its face.
The third major type of decree is the mail-order divorce, usually
procured from Mexico, in which neither party has appeared in person
in the divorcing court. Although these divorces are authorized under
the laws of most Mexican jurisdictions,' s they are uniformly condemned
in the United States. They have nonetheless been granted some recog-
nition in this country, despite the usual appellate pronouncements that
they are legal nullities.
Finally, extranational decrees must depend for their recognition
entirely on doctrines of comity, estoppel, and state-imposed res judi-
cata, since they are entitled to no protection under the Constitution.
What is this magic ingredient "domicile," which apparently is required
to immunize foreign ex parte and extranational decrees from collateral
attack? American courts and legislatures have generally insisted that
for a court to have jurisdiction to sever the marriage bonds, the mar-
riage, or the parties to it, must somehow be domiciled in the jurisdic-
tion.' 9 But the states' definitions of domicile, the presumptions they
have established concerning it, and the direct evidence they require
to prove its existence vary greatly,-from the apparent absence of any
statutory minimum in an Alabama "participating" divorce ° to three
years in Connecticut.2' Except for a unique New York doctrine z2 state
17 See, e.g., Baldwin v. Baldwin, 28 Cal. 2d 406, 170 P.2d 670 (1946); Huntington
v. Huntington, 120 Cal. App. 2d 705, 262 P.2d 104 (1953); Coleman v. Coleman, 92
Cal. App. 2d 312, 206 P.2d 1093 (1949).
18 See 2 F.mIy LAwyrRa § 33.18.
19 "[Wjhen it comes to dissolving a marriage status, throughout the English-speak-
ing world the basis of power to act is domicile." Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 357
(1948) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.). That this statement is too sweeping, see
Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 678 (3d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion of Hastie, J.);
EmwNzwGEG § 71, at 238-42; Stimson, Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: the Unsoundness
of the Domiciliary Theory, 42 A.B.A.J. 222 (1956).
20Ar.. CoDE tit. 34, § 29 (1958); see text accompanying notes 48-51 infra. (dis-
cussed infra at p. 19).
21 E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. AuN. § 46-13 (1958).
22 New York permits couples married in New York to divorce there, no matter
where their households or how brief their sojourn in the state. See EHBNzwEiG § 71,
at 239 n.30. Ehrenzweig discusses this rule as an exception to the domicile requirement,
but it may also be viewed as merely extending the definition of the term; i.e., that the
marriage remains somehow domiciled there.
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laws and decisions generally do not permit courts to grant divorces
where neither spouse is a domiciliary at that time.m
Domicile was of little significance in the days of legislative divorce
and the early years of judicial divorce, when American society was
more observant of the religious prohibitions against divorce, and when
families tended to stay in the communities where they had established
roots. To ensure that the marriage, and the family of which it was the
foundation, would not be broken up without having answered to the
community of which it was an integral part, it was natural that marital
difficulties would be settled at home. During the latter part of the
nineteenth century, all Anglo-American jurisdictions adhered to this
principle of hometown "local resolution."24 The foreign state was
usually almost as anxious to prevent use of its divorce machinery by
non-domiciliaries as the home state was to keep the resolution of
domiciliaries' marital discord within its boundaries. Also, the grounds
for divorce were strict and fairly uniform in the early days of judicial
divorce, so there was little incentive to migrate for divorce.
The twentieth century, however, has produced drastic changes in
our concept of marriage and the family. Nowadays, for all too many
Americans, marriage changes quickly from a "gateway to repentance"
to a "device for punishment. 25 Nevertheless, many home states refuse
to indulge the resulting demands for immediate divorce. Like New
York" they limit the grounds for divorce to adultery, or like Texas
2 7
and California,2 they impose fixed delays before rendering the inter-
locutory or the final decree of divorce.29 Other states now have laws
and customs to provide divorces quickly, and with few questions asked,
for out-of-state citizens. Although these jurisdictions continue to insist
23 Some states make exceptions for locally stationed servicemen. See generally
2 F.mmy LAvwYR §§ 11.3-11.13.
24 Emm.NZwEIG § 71, at 238 n.24.
25 Compare Barnes v. Barnes, 110 Cal. 418, 421, 42 Pac. 904, 905 (1895) (denying
annulment for wife's concealed antenuptial unchastity: "Previous unchaste conduct,
although concealed, does not invalidate a marriage. 'Public policy pronounces otherwise
and opens marriage as the gateway to repentance and virtue.' Caveat emptor governs."),
with DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 864, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (1952) ("It is a
degradation of marriage and a frustration of its purposes when the courts use it as a
device for punishment."
28 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 6-8.
27 TEx. BEv. Civ. STAT. art. 4632 (1960) (sixty days).
2 8 CAL. CIv. CODE § 132 (one year).
29 Direct restraints on remarriage are usually ineffective since most states recognize
all foreign marriages, even of their own domiciliaries, if not violative of a basic public
policy of the recognizing (home) state. Compare CAL. Civ. CODE § 63 with CAL. Crv.
CoDE §§ 59-60. See also In re Mays Estate, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1956); Emwx-
ZWEIG § 79.
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that the jurisdiction of their courts depends upon "bona fide domicile," 0
in practice the trial courts inquire hardly at all into the plans of the
applicants.2 ' The resulting stream of litigants from the strict states to
Nevada, Idaho, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, and the Virgin Islands has
produced a great cleavage between state interest and party autonomy,
for many home states are jealous of their role as a third party in loco
parentis to every divorce suit.
What law is to decide whether domicile is present? In Williams II
the Supreme Court left the definition of domicile up to the home court,
but if the Court continues to hold that "bona fide domicile" is a con-
stitutional prerequisite to interstate recognition of divorce decrees
under the full faith and credit clause, it will eventually have to define
minimum standards of "constitutional domicile" for purposes of full
faith and credit."82 Especially difficult will be the question of how far
the home state's definition can deviate from the one used by the divorc-
ing state. Nevada purports to require an intention to remain indefinitely
in the divorcing state. 3 Suppose Nevada should adopt a "sojourn"
statute that explicitly dispenses with the domicile requirement or
makes six weeks' residence conclusive evidence of domicile, such as
the one adopted in the Virgin Islands and struck down in 1955 by the
Supreme Court in Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith,34 on non-con-
stitutional grounds. The Court would then have to decide not only
whether Nevada could constitutionally assert jurisdiction on mere
fixed-term residence without proof of intent to remain, but also whether
another state could ignore such a Nevada' definition of domicile in
determining whether to give full faith and credit to a Nevada ex parte
divorce.
We have been examining the pronouncements of legislatures and
courts on the necessity of domicile; but in some states the executive,
too, has given force to the requirement that there be domicile for
divorce by threatening or instituting bigamy proceedings against a
person who marries again after receiving a decree in a state where the
30 See, e.g., Lamb v. Lamb, 57 Nev. 421, 65 P.2d 872 (1937).
31 See Ingram & Ballard, The Business of Migratory Divorce in Nevada, 2 LAw &
CoNTMr. PROB. 302 (1935) for a very entertaining analysis of the customs of the
Nevada bar by two Reno practitioners.
32 "The Constitution does not mention domicile . . . judges have imported it."
Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226, 255 (1944) (dissenting opinion of
Rutledge, J.). It may be that the Court eventually will expressly disavow the require-
ament. See generally Alexander, The Follies of Divorce, 36 A.B.A.J. 105 (1950); Paulsen,
Divorce Jurisdiction by Consent of the Parties, 26 IND. L.J. 380 (1951).
33 E.g., Barber v. Barber, 47 Nev. 377, 222 Pac. 284 (1924).
84349 U.S. 1 (1954).
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home-state authorities believe he has not established a bona fide domi-
cile. Williams II expressly permits a re-examination of domicile for
purposes of bigamy prosecution. It is presently an open question
whether the res judicata doctrine of Sherrer, as extended in 1951 John-
son v. Muelberger,5 will "estop" even a bigamy prosecutor from reliti-
gating the jurisdiction of the divorcing court, or whether the theory
that "the state is a party to every divorce proceeding" and was un-
represented in the foreign divorce proceedings, will permit conviction
even in cases of "participating" divorces.36
Until the recent exposition of the doctrine of "divisible divorce,"
the home state could point out that ex parte divorces threatened not
only the existence of the marriage, but also the ancillary support rights
to which the stay-at-home spouse might otherwise have been entitled.
With the advent of Estin v. Estin,3 7 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,38 and
Hudson v. Hudson" the United States and California Supreme Courts
have declared it proper to litigate support rights independent of the
out-of-state action to sever the marriage bonds; therefore, little remains
of this argument. The last major effort to re-establish the supremacy of
state interest, the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act,40 makes residence
in the "home" state twelve months before divorce and eighteen months
after divorce presumptive evidence of lack of domicile in the divorcing
state, and declares divorces without such domiciles "of no force or
effect" in the home state. Only a few states have enacted this legisla-
tion; it has had little practical effect because most divorces are "partic-
ipating" and not subject to challenge despite the presumptions of
invalidity set forth in the act.
The Law and Bar Association Opinions on Ethics
in Migratory Divorce
Many American cases, as well as opinions of bar association ethics
and grievance committees, have commented upon the ethical duty of
the family lawyer in migratory divorce. Many of these expressions of
85 340 U.S. 581 (1950). "When a divorce cannot be attacked for lack of jurisdiction
by parties actually before the court or strangers in the rendering state, it cannot be
attacked by them anywhere in the union." 340 U.S. at 587.
36 See generally EMIENzwEIG § 74.
37334 U.S. 541 (1948).
38 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
39 52 Cal. 2d 735, 344 P.2d 295 (1959).
40 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 150-150.4. California adopted the act in 1949 but it has had
an especially limited application due to the liberal use of estoppel and standing-to-sue
arguments to bar challenges to divorces ostensibly condemned by the act.
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judicial and professional opinion date from before World War II, and
changed social attitudes toward divorce have weakened their author-
ity. Others, such as Griffith v. State Bar,41 to be discussed below, rep-
resent more recent judicial pronouncements which circumscribe very
strictly the lawyer's ethical duty in migratory divorce. In almost every
state the bar association grievance and ethics committees are generally
composed of the more conservative lawyers in the community, who are
frequently associated with firms which avoid family law problems as
"messy" and unbecoming of the profession.42 The existing opinions,
while significant as the only extant formal expression of the views of
the organized bar, must, therefore, be taken with salt sufficient to
counteract their frequently impractical loftiness.
There is debate even upon the preliminary question of whether
a lawyer may inform a prospective migrant 43 what the law of another
state or country appears to provide (e.g., residence requirements,
grounds for divorce, etc.). On the one hand, the ABA Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances44 has suggested that giving this
advice to a client is proper, provided it is made clear that the lawyer
is not licensed to practice in the foreign jurisdiction, and provided that
lawyers take responsibility for the information they supply.45 The con-
trary view is that a lawyer not licensed to practice in the state whose
law is being examined must not supply information as to that state's
requirements, since he is not a member of. its bar, not amenable to its
discipline,46 and presumably not always up-to-date on judicial de-
cisions, rules changes, or changing standards in the foreign state.47
The courts ought to hold that an attorney is acting within his proper
province when he informs his clients as to what appears to be the law
in another jurisdiction. A clear labeling of his status as a non-prac-
4140 Cal. 2d 470, 254 P.2d 22 (1953).
42 See Diamond, The Lawyer and Family Law, a Point of View, in I FAmnry
LAwYm 43 (1962).
43 We have defined "migrant" as a spouse intending to return promptly to his home
in California. See note 4 supra.
44 Hereinafter cited as ABA Committee; its opinions are designated ABA Opinion
- (No.) and are printed in a supplemented volume, ABA OP mNs OF THE Comm.nirr
ON FROFESSIONAL ETmIcs AND GnmvANmCs (1957).
45 Compare ABA Opinion 263 (1944) concerning foreign lawyers: "Ordinarily the
Chicago lawyer would not be qualified or equipped to advise as to how the transaction
could be carried through comfortably to the laws of that foreign country; yet it is clear
that a lawyer assumes a substantial degree of legal responsibility for the correctness of
the advice he undertakes to give. By giving such advice he represents that he is qualified
to do so."
46 He may still be disciplined in his own state for fraud on a foreign court.
47 This view would class the out-of-state lawyer with the law student, who must
keep silent on all legal questions, no matter how tempting.
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titioner there, coupled with an outline of the sources used, plus a
caveat that more conclusive and up-to-date information may be avail-
able from a member of the other state's bar, ought to satisfy his ethical
duty.
Can the California lawyer advance a professional opinion on open
or ambiguous questions of law which appear to have no clear-cut
answer in the foreign jurisdiction? It would appear that he must have
this authority to serve his client adequately, especially if the foreign
state is far away and the local lawyer is acting not merely as a legal
encyclopedia for his divorce client, but as confidant and old friend, so
that in practical terms'it would be extremely difficult to refuse to ex-
amine the foreign law and render a professional opinion. For example,
at present it is not at all certain what interpretation the Supreme Court
of Alabama will finally give to Title 34, section 29 of the Code of
Alabama, which provides that the evidence must show the complain-
ant to be a "resident" of Alabama at the time the bill for divorce is
filed.48 Nor has the Nevada Supreme Court definitively stated whether
Nevada's professed requirement of intent to remain in Nevada "in-
definitely"49 would encompass a plaintiff who answered the judge that
by "indefinitely" she meant she didn't know whether she would go
back to Los Angeles on Thursday or Friday. 0 Should the California
lawyer refuse to research or discuss these issues, even if they are clearly
material to the suit of long-time clients? Hopefully, the California
Supreme Court will not require him to turn his back on his clients'
marital difficulties.
There are two reasons generally given for not going out of state.
One is couched in terms of public policies: the state of the family
domicile is said to have a dominant interest in the matrimonial status
of its citizens, so that it should be the sole arbiter of their proposed
divorce. The other is a rule of practice: because of the uncertainty of
the law, and the widespread reliance upon the state-interest approach
just mentioned, a foreign divorce runs great risk of non-recognition,
and thus should be avoided lest it prove unenforceable upon return
home. We will consider these two arguments separately.
In In re Backesl the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated the con-
servative position in the following language:
The law regards divorce actions as imposing special responsibilities
48 See Hilley v. Hifley, 275 Ala. 617, 157 So. 2d 215 (1963).
49 Lamb v. Lamb, 57 Nev. 421, 65 P.2d 872 (1937).
IO See Drinker, Problems of Professional Ethics in Matrimonial Litigation, 66 HArry.
L. REv. 443, 462 n.74 (1953).
51 16 N.J. 430, 109 A.2d 273 (1954).
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upon the court and attorneys as officers of the court. This is because
in every suit for divorce the State is in fact if not in name a third
party having a substantial interest. The public is represented by the
conscience of the court ...and "The law regards these actions
which tend to disrupt the marriage status with regret-certainly it
does not encourage them....
Our rules of court governing matrimonial actions ... cast special
burdens upon attorneys in the conduct of such actions, in purpose-
ful reflection of the deep concern for the maintenance of the integrity
of such proceedings to avert disservice to the public interest. The
rules recognize that protection of the State's interest in particular
cases necessarily lies with the attorneys in the first instance because
of their superior knowledge of facts made known to the court or-
dinarily through their representations.
52
it is apparent that the New Jersey court's concept of "state interest"
encompasses more than insuring that a New Jersey court will be the
one to hear all of the facts; "state interest" means an interest in keeping
husband and wife married. For example, New Jersey continues to fol-
low the rule that recrimination is not merely a defense to divorce, but
is an absolute bar no matter what the wishes of the spouses, if any
facts exist to support such a charge against the plaintiff . 3
In the Backes case, plaintiff's attorney charged the defendant wife
with desertion, not mentioning that his client had married more than
seven years after his separation from defendant, at which time he had
believed the defendant dead. Defendant pleaded plaintiff's "adultery"
as a bar to divorce. The New Jersey Supreme Court of Errors sus-
pended Backes for one year (three judges out of seven voting for dis-
barment) for failing to disclose in the complaint that his client had
remarried after seven years." We have not found another recent case
imposing such a fiercely rigid standard. California would surely not be
so dogmatic. Our supreme court has many times expressed its concern
over the growing divorce rate, but it has recognized that the law must
reflect, as well as determine, the mores of the times. In the celebrated
1952 case of DeBurgh v. DeBurgh,55 the court decided that in ap-
propriate cases proof of a cause of divorce against the plaintiff would
521d. at 433-34, 109 A.2d at 274-75.
5 3 For some years following Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), New Jersey
even refused to apply the rule of compulsory recognition of sister state migratory par-
ticipating divorces laid down in that case, wherever it found what it believed to be
"fraud" on the sister state's court. New Jersey has now abandoned that position. Nappe
v. Nappe, 20 N.J. 337, 120 A.2d 31 (1956).
54 The New York committees do not even consider such action unethical, let alone
ground for disbarment. Drinker likewise disagrees with New Jersey. Drinker, supra note
50, at 448-49.
55 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
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no longer automatically bar a divorce, but might lead instead to a
granting of divorce to both parties. The court said that "it is a degrada-
tion of marriage and a frustration of its purposes when the courts use
it as a device for punishment."6
Even the ABA Committee remarked, as early as 1932, that
in many divorce cases the best interests of both parties will be
promoted by a reconciliation; but in other cases the best interests
of one or the other or even of both parties will be promoted by the
divorce. If the attorney honestly believed that the best interests of
his client would be prejudiced by a reconciliation, it was, in the
opinion of the committee, entirely proper for him to advise his client
to that effect.57
The practical effect of New Jersey's rigidity has been largely alleviated
by the res judicata doctrines of Sherrer v. Sherrer,8 Johnson v. Muel-
berger,59 and Cook v. Cook.60 The New Jersey Supreme Court has had
to subordinate its views to the constitutional compulsion of those cases,
albeit reluctantly.
61
Even before Sherrer the grievance committees had begun to recog-
nize the propriety of legal advice on out-of-state divorces. The early
decisions did not explicitly base their conclusions on the right and duty
of the lawyer to inform his clients of all means open to achieve their
aims. 2 In 1912 a majority of the New York County Committee held it
proper for a New York lawyer to advise that a New York decree
prohibiting the client's marriage with the correspondent did not bar
her going to Connecticut and contracting a new marriage which the
New York courts would recognize as valid and not punishable as a
contempt.63 But the committee added that it disapproved of the law-
yer's going to Connecticut with the client and giving her away, as
'likely to be misunderstood" and tending to "diminish public respect
for the profession." Thereafter a majority of the same committee ruled
that it was proper for a New York lawyer to represent a deserted wife
56 39 Cal. 2d at 864, 250 P.2d at 601.
57ABA Opinion 82 (1932). (Emphasis added.)
58 334 U.S. 343 (1948). See note 11 supra.
59 340 U.S. 581 (1951). See note 11 supra.
00342 U.S. 126 (1951). See note 11 supra.
ol "But in the situation here presented under the cases above cited our public policy
must bow to the constitutional principles set forth on those cases by the United States
Supreme Court." Nappe v. Nappe, 20 N.J. 337, 120 A.2d 31 (1956).
62 ABA, CANoNs op PRoFESsIoNAL ETmIcs Canon 8 (1908); see DRINRn , LEGAL
ETsucs 102-03 (1953). "Counsel can hardly be expected, therefore, to refuse their
assistance to spouses seeking a legal status sanctioned by the highest court of the
country." EHRiENzwG § 72, at 243.
63 N.Y. County Opinion 12 discussed in DI ERn , LEGAL Ermcs 122 (1953).
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in making an agreement with the husband: she agreed to change her
domicile to a state where desertion would be sufficient for divorce,
and he agreed to accept service and pay a substantial settlement and
fees. The majority stated that it
was unable to agree with the minority that the mere fact that the
statutes of New York do not provide for the relief desired in the case
suggested is sufficient ground to condemn the arrangement or the
participation of a New York lawyer in aid of relief elsewhere accord-
ing to the law there in force. In the opinion of the majority, the vice
of such arrangements does not arise from the state of the law in New
York, but from possible imposition upon the foreign court by con-
cealment of the actual facts, and a fraudulent resort to the foreign
state by one only colorably a resident of such state.64
It is interesting that even this committee was not concerned with state
interest, but with imposition on the other spouse (the ex parte situa-
tion), 65 and with fraud on the foreign court.
A minority considered it unprofessional to assist in an arrangement
"the object of which is to escape the operation of the laws of this.
state .... And a recent writer has remarked as follows:
[T]he lawyer, the client and the court all collude in misrepresenting
that Nevada has sufficient connection with the marital status to give
it jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage. Under this reasoning, a fraud
is perpetrated by all participants upon New York, the state of domi-
cile to which the parties will return. Nevada has no interest in the
status of the parties, that state likely will never see them again
(unless for a subsequent "quickie" divorce). New York is the vitally
interested state, for it is no legal myth that the state of domicile has
an interest in the status of its citizens in marriage and divorce. It is
the state which must cope with the imminent problems of divorce,
such as the woman becoming a public charge or an immoral person
in order to sustain herself, and the welfare of the children whose
home has been broken.66
Nevertheless, after Williams-like ex parte proceedings or mail-order
divorces, the way is still open for state courts to apply this state interest
doctrine as strictly as the New Jersey court did in the Backes case. But
the recent development of the doctrine of divisible divorce 7 has re-
64 N.Y. County Opinion 100 discussed in Dnnaaa, LEGAL ErHIcs 123 (1953).
65 No longer an important problem since the advent of the "divisible divorce."
66 Note, The Role of the Lawyer in Divorce: Some Ethical Problems. 21 U. Prrr.
L- REv. 720, 728-29 (1960). The author appears to be unaware that custody may always
be litigated at home. The reference to "immoral women" would have been more ap-
propriate in the 19th century.
67 "State interest" may yet find its renaissance in a possible state prosecution for
bigamy despite Sherrer. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
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duced the need for invoking the state interest to protect deserted wives
and children; they now can relitigate at home the support and custody
awards of a foreign ex parte divorce decree.
Consider New York's vital state interest in the marriage and divorce
of its Governor, Nelson Rockefeller. Surely if we are to expect anyone
to eschew an arrangement "the object of which is to escape the opera-
tion of the laws of this state," it should be the Governor. Yet we all
recognize that it would have been impossible for the Governor to have
played the charade of "hotel divorce" which would have been a pre-
requisite to a New York divorce. What real state interest does New
York have now in the Rockefeller or Murphy families?
The second major reason commonly given for not going out of state
is a more practical one than the traditional state interest approach.
Given the uncertainty in this area of the law, the argument goes, the
client runs too great a chance of having his foreign decree declared
invalid after he returns home. It is true that a far more satisfactory
professional job can be done at home, but it does not follow that a
client ought not to be allowed to make this choice for himself, after
being candidly told of the risks he runs. Moreover, the risks vary
widely, depending upon the type of divorce, where procured, the de-
gree of spousal cooperation, the competence, common sense and fair-
ness of counsel and of the clients, and whether a California underpin-
ning by way of simultaneous local proceeding has been provided. Let
us consider this argument in terms of the four major types of divorce:
participating, ex parte, mail-order, and extranational. Since the argu-
ment is based on the probability of judicial non-recognition of a decree,
our discussion will necessarily refer to the general law of divorce juris-
diction already discussed above.
Participating sister state divorces present the least problem. With
the possible exception of a later bigamy prosecution,68 the Sherrer and
Johnson cases make it virtually impossible to challenge the foreign
decree, so long as the issue of the foreign court's jurisdiction has been
litigated (as it always must be, at least impliedly). Even conservative
writers, though they deplore the result of the Sherrer doctrine, agree
that since it is in fact true that clients can immunize their admittedly
migratory divorce by "participating," counsel have an unquestioned
right and duty to advise clients of this possible solution to their prob-
lems. 69
68 See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
69 See, e.g., Note, The Role of the Lawyer in Divorce: Some Ethical Problems, 21
U. Prrr. L. REv. 720, 729 (1960). These writers consider it very important that many
courts, including the California Supreme Cout, continue to distinguish between "valid"
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Ex parte divorces present the real problem here. As indicated be-
low, the lawyer ought to make every effort to avoid ex parte proceed-
ings; but if one is unavoidable, the client certainly runs a greater risk
of having it overturned as fraudulent if it can later be established that
it is a migratory divorce. Deprived of the broad umbrella of Sherrer,
Johnson, and Cook, the lawyer whose client is the plaintiff in an ex
parte proceeding must make absolutely clear to his client the added
risk he is taking. A "California underpinning ' 70 may save the divorce,
but the lawyer must make it a rule of practice to obtain the absent
spouse's waiver if at all possible.
Another problem area is that of Mexican divorces. These decrees
come in two common varieties: the one-day stopover, and the mail-
order decree. The Juarez divorce has become more fashionable among
wives of ballplayers and movie idols than the comparatively mundane
Vegas sojourn. It is also much quicker. The neon signs greeting the




In a stopover Mexican divorce there is at least some appearance in
court by a party to the marriage. Even if both parties appear, however,
the divorces are not "participating" divorces in the sense in which we
have been using the term above, since a Mexican adjudication of its
own jurisdiction is not entitled to the constitutional benefits of the full
faith and credit clause. They are properly considered as extranational
divorces, discussed below.7
1
A mail-order divorce is one obtained without either party actually
journeying to Mexico. These divorces are proper under most Mexican
decrees and decrees which, though "invalid" "legal nullities" with "no force or effect,"
nevertheless may not be challenged. "But surely the Court, speaking in Sherrer and the
related cases, did not intend to condone fraudulent divorces; it held only that such may
not be collaterally attacked when defendant has appeared .... It is submitted that the
latter argument is the stronger one. Just because it cannot be attacked does not justify
the lawyer in perpetrating a fraudulent divorce. To advise in favor of such a divorce may
be analogized to counseling one who has an absolute privilege to utter a slander because
he has an absolute defense." ibid. Quaere whether one with an absolute defense can
utter a slander? See also Drinker, Problems of Professional Ethics in Matrimonial Litiga-
tion, 66 Hav. L. Ruv. 443, 454 (1953) (treat a Sherrer-type divorce as the practical
equivalent of a "valid" decree); Groves, Migratory Divorce, 2 LAw & CoNTramso. PRob.
293, 298 (1935).
70 Used here to mean a simultaneous local proceeding.
71 See text accompanying notes 90-92 infra.
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laws, 72 for appearance by counsel alone in divorce matters appears to
be no more shocking to Mexican practitioners than representation by
counsel alone in tax or probate matters is in this country. But the idea
that party autonomy should be so far extended is anathema to most
American courts.73 Even Congress has echoed this view by declaring it
a felony to mail foreign divorce information with intent to solicit
business.74
We shall see that some states, including California, follow a strict
doctrine of estoppel to deny any divorce in which the attacker has
participated or acquiesced. This doctrine has not been adopted under
constitutional compulsion, but rather reflects the general equitable
principles behind estoppel, as well as an important social policy against
upsetting subsequent marriages. Should not this same doctrine apply
to mail-order decrees? To our knowledge, California has not yet so
held, but it would be entirely in keeping with her broad application of
the doctrines of estoppel and standing-to-sue to do so. If a judgment
of a sister state can be "invalid" and of "no force or effect" and yet be
unassailable, 75 there is no reason why mail-order decrees warrant a
different treatment, especially where both spouses have participated.
76
It is best for the California lawyer to assume that a mail-order
decree is as yet totally void for all purposes in this state; yet the law-
yer is doing less than his duty to his client if he does not point out
that there have been some curious American decisions in recent years
which have given effect to Mexican mail-order decrees. Although state
courts roundly condemn such decrees as violative of "law, procedure
and public policy,"77 declaring them 'legal nullities,"78 they have
72 See 2 FAmLY LAwIm § 33.18.
73 Yet over three-fourths of the states allow plaintiff, defendant, and witnesses all
to appear in a divorce action by deposition only. California is in the small minority.
74 18 U.S.C. § 1714 (1958). There have been no cases, but anyone presuming to
write on this topic should be careful.
75 See note 69 supra.
76 California cases holding mail-order decrees void as against the public policy of
the state are: DeQuesnoy v. Henderson, 24 Cal. App. 2d 11, 74 P.2d 294 (1937); Kegley
v. Kegley, 16 Cal. App. 2d 216, 60 P.2d 482 (1936); Ryder v. Ryder, 2 Cal. App. 2d
426, 434, 37 P.2d 1067, 1072 (1934) ("It would be a strange situation if the court
where the parties reside were bound by the rules of public policy and the parties could,
by subterfuge or evasion, by correspondence, obtain a decree in another forum."). Note
that all of these district court cases antedate Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S.
287 (1942), and Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1943), as well as the recent California
Supreme Court decisions firmly establishing estoppel as more important than defeating
otherwise "invalid" Mexican jurisdiction. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d
613 (1957) (a "stopover" case). See 2 FAnrx Lwan § 33.46.
77 In re Anonymous, 274 App. Div. 89, 80 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1948).
78 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955).
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nevertheless been held effective: to deny a widow a statutory share in
her husband's estate;79 to govern "private claims"; 80 and to bar a
compensation claim.81 Can counsel be expected to ignore these very
real effects of 'legal nullities" when his clients inquire of him? Most
of these cases force the party who obtained the decree to eat its bitter
fruits as well; but there are cases in which such decrees have been
considered in favor of the party seeking to present the decree.82
In 1942 the ABA Committee roundly condemned as "illegal and
unethical" the practice of "participating and aiding in the procurement
of admittedly illegal Mexican divorces for New York residents."83 Even
more ominous is In re Anonymous,8 4 in which the Appellate Division,
First Department, considered a motion to discipline a Nevw York at-
torney who had participated in obtaining a Mexican mail-order divorce
for New York clients. The court stated:
Respondent conceded that he knew of the views expressed by our
courts in the cited cases. He so advised his client. He contends, how-
ever, that his conduct in advising the client should not be found
reprehensible in the absence of an express prohibition by this court
against the assistance by a New York attorney in securing such a
divorce.
It should be unnecessary for the courts to have to expressly advise
attorneys that their conduct is to be performed within the law and
not in an attempt to flout it....
In view of the novelty of this proceeding and in the absence of
any collusive conduct by the respondent, the motion for an order
adjudging the respondent guilty of professional misconduct is denied.
For the information of the Bar, we state, however, that repetition of
like conduct in the future by an attorney will be deemed sufficient
basis for appropriate disciplinary action.85
It is no wonder that this troubled area of mail-order divorces in-
spired Judge Conway of the New York Court of Appeals to remark in
his dissent in In re Rathscheck's Estate:
79In re Rathschecek's Estate, 300 N.Y. 346, 90 N.E.2d 887 (1950).
80 Dom v. Doam, 202 Misc. 1057, 112 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Sup. Ct. 1952), aff'd, 282 App.
Div. 597, 126 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1953). But see Magner v. Hobby, 215 F.2d 190, 194
(2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 919 (1955); In re Chomsky's Estate, 101 N.Y.S.2d
60 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
81 Unruh v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Ariz. 118, 301 P.2d 1029 (1956).
82 See, e.g., Petition of Smith, 71 F. Supp. 968 (D.N.J. 1947); In re Greulich's
Petition, 37 N.J. Super. 371, 117 A.2d 316 (1955) (considered in naturalization proceed-
ing against charge of bigamy). But cf. Petition of Da Silva, 140 F. Supp. 596 (D.N.J.
1956).
83 ABA Opinion 248 (1942).
84274 App. Div. 89, 80 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1948), 49 CoLum. L. REv. 128 (1949).
85 274 App. Div. at 90, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 76. See also In re Cohen, 10 N.J. 601, 93
A.2d 4 (1952); In re Matters of EsquitoI, 285 App. Div. 138, 111 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1954).
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By reversing, we make it necessary for an attorney to advise a client
. . . in a contemplated application for a Mexican mail-order decree
based solely upon a collusive contract violating our State public
policy, that if both enter into such contract (since both must agree
and sign) the client will insure the fact that if the marital partner
survives, that partner will have no distributive share in the clients
estate. An attorney will be under the necessity of advising his client
that if he or she disregards the public policy of this State and enters
into such a collusive contract to dissolve the marriage, and obtains
a mail-order divorce upon it, while it will not affect the marriage
obligation in this State, it will immediately put into operation and fix
forever rights of descent and distribution of the survivor of the two
spouses; that that will be true regardless of what either or both of
them may do thereafter and regardless even of a decree of our
Supreme Court declaring the Mexican mail-order divorce void and
of no effect, upon direct attack with personal jurisdiction of both
parties. There may be no repentance."
There may indeed be no repentance. If the courts are so uncertain as
to the actual effect of a mail-order divorce, they should be especially
circumspect in condemning attorneys for having guessed wrong. Cer-
tainly with the substantive law as it is in several states, the lawyer
cannot take the courts at their word that mail-order decrees are "legal
nullities." It is no wonder that Ehrenzweig concludes that "the prin-
cipal practical difference between a Nevada divorce and a Mexican
divorce now appears to be the comparative inexpensiveness of the
latter." There is only one practical solution to this dilemma, and
Henry Drinker has put it succinctly, if hesitatingly:
In connection with these cases a distinction may perhaps be
drawn between advising a local client of his or her rights, and
affnnatively participating, even to the extent of recommending a
Mexican lawyer. Much can be said in favor of a lawyer's right and
duty to advise an intelligent client correctly on any question of
law as to which the client consults him and as to which he is com-
petent to give advice.88
Even if one's home state still declines to recognize a Mexican mail-order
decree for any purpose, the lawyer must inform his client that other
states, such as New York, may give the decree some effect should he
later move there; and it is far from certain that the lawyer's home state
will never change its position. Even this lowly wetback decree is en-
titled to share in the dignity of the doctrine that a divorce decree, once
granted and valid on its face, must be presumed valid until declared
otherwise.
86 300 N.Y. at 350, 90 N.E.2d at 892.
87 EmmwzwEiG § 72, at 243.
SSDmia6 L E . ETmcs 150 n.9 (1953).
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The authors conclude that it is both unjust and inconsistent with
the confused state of the law to consider it unethical for counsel to
help clients, who have been warned of the perils, find competent for-
eign counsel, let alone merely to advise them of the effects a mail-order
divorce may have upon their lives. 9
The fourth major group of divorces is extranational decrees. Since
the decline of interest in Parisian decrees, which were all the rage in
the 1930's,90 only Mexican divorces seem to have caught the fancy of
the jet set, and the stateside overtones of other extranational divorces
have accordingly diminished greatly. Since extranational decrees are
not entitled to full faith and credit, each state is free to accept or reject
them case by case. What standards should govern counsel in such
cases? Ehrenzweig has suggested what might be called the "likelihood"
test: "If, as is the case in New York, a foreign non-domiciliary divorce
may be recognized as valid, there is no reason why an American at-
torney should not assist in its procurement. On the other hand, he
should be held to act unethically if assisting in obtaining a divorce
likely to be held void in his or the spouses' state."9 1 While safe, this
test seems to the authors much too impractical and hesitating.
Though it may never rank with mobilia sequuntur personam, "you
never can tell 'til you try" is as familiar to lawyers as is the growing
penchant of judges to reconsider their past rigidities. In this special
area of the extranational decree, unfettered by full faith and credit
problems, counsel ought to be free to argue for whatever the local
court will be willing to recognize, and should not be required to avoid
all cases in which the state court will "likely" refuse to recognize the
extranational decree. 2 True, the prudent lawyer will not advise his
clients to rely on such a decree if there is any question in his mind
89 For excellent material on Mexican divorces, see 2 F.A-4mr.y LAWa, § 33, and
especially the bibliography following § 33.48.
90 See Bates, Divorce of Americans in France, 2 LAw & CoNrTEM. PROB. 322
(1935).
91EHnEmzwxiG § 72, at 243. (Emphasis added.) Professor Ehrenzweig bravely
adds: "But the problem is complicated by certain discrepancies between judicial language
and action." Ibid.
92 See generally 2 FAmmY LAWYER §§ 33.33-33.48. California's law is far from
fixed in this difficult area. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 51 Cal. 2d 249, 255-56, 331 P.2d 641,
645 (1958) (concurring opinion of Traynor, J.) (domicile should not be the sole basis
for testing jurisdiction of foreign courts); CAL. CoDE Cry. Poc. § 1915 (foreign final
judgments have same effect in California as in rendering state). Compare Sumner,
Effect in California of Mexican Divorces, 33 CAL. S.BJ. 15, 21 (1958) (§ 1915 is
meaningless in contest of Mexican divorces), with Currie, Justice Traynor and the Con-
flict of Laws, 13 S.N. L. REv. 719 (1961) (§ 1915 has a new lease on life because of
Scott, supra).
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about his own court's view of it; but surely this should not become the
standard for discipline in such an uncharted sea.
Duty to Foreign Court? (Herein of "Deceiving" a
Nevada Court)
It would be well to begin this section by warning the reader that, if
the reasoning of the courts in the matters we have so far considered
has seemed at times tortuous, the present section is never-never land.
In this section we encounter that mythical beast, the Nevada trial
judge, who is "deceived" into believing testimony by a Van Nuys
schoolteacher that she intends to remain in Las Vegas "indefinitely."
Up to this point we have been discussing the responsibility of the
lawyer toward his own jurisdiction (usually that of the spouses'
customary residence); here we shall discuss counsel's responsibility
toward the courts in which his client will be seeking a migratory
divorce.
Let us again begin with a statement of the conservative position:
Once an attorney has [informed his client of the sister state's
laws] ... and leaves it to the voluntary decision of the client as to
whether such a proceeding is to be instituted by the client in a
foreign jurisdiction, counsel may suggest the name of a reputable
attorney in such other state .... We deem it advisable to state this
warning, however, that at that point the attorney should terminate
the relationship of attorney and client, present his bill and be paid
for his services. Any participation thereafter in the divorce proceed-
ing in the foreign state may form a foundation of a charge that the
New Jersey attorney is particeps criminis when subsequently a fraud
is perpetrated upon the courts of the foreign state .... 93
The New Jersey court rightly condemns "fraud," 94 but what is "fraud"
under the circumstances of the typical migratory divorce, whether in
Mexico, Nevada, or Alabama? The Mexican courts operate under
statutes of the Mexican states, the most important of which recognize
voluntary submission as a sufficient basis for divorce jurisdiction in
their own courts 5 Presumably then, no Mexican court is deceived ff
the parties in fact appear there, since they need testify to no intentions
of residence which they do not intend to fulfil. Drinker suggests that
93 Nappe v. Nappe, 20 N.J. 337, 346, 120 A.2d 31, 36 (1956); accord, ABA Opinion
84 (1932) (fraud upon the court "where such residence is not intended to be bona fide
but is for the sole purpose of obtaining the divorce").
94 Until very recently New Jersey held that "fraud" on a foreign court invalidated
even Sherrer-type participating divorces. Scblemm v. Sehleimu, 31 N.J. 557, 158 A.2d
508 (1960); Staedler v. Staedler, 6 N.J. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951).
95 See 2 FAmmy LAwymi §§ 33.22-33.32.
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the same result would obtain "should Nevada or Florida amend its
divorce law by providing that a sojourn of six weeks or ninety days
will be sufficient to give its courts jurisdiction."96 Though such a
change would resolve problems of "duty" to these divorcing courts,
would it resolve all ethical problems? The Supreme Court continues
to intimate that some sort of domiciliary intent is necessary to give
constitutional protection to out-of-state divorces; therefore, problems
of home-state recognition might remain.
7
Likewise, Bishop James A. Pike, of the San Francisco Bar, has
pointed out that in Nevada it is true that
fraud is built into the arrangement, in one sense: there is no intent
to change residence and to answer the standard question of the
foreign' court as to intention to settle there, there is a quick affim-
ance of that which in no way corresponds to the true situation. Yet,
in another way, it is not fraud: nobody is fooled. It is certainly not
fraud upon the court, since by virtue of the whole pattern, the court
is actually part of the fraud. In short, no judge is deceived; no one
intends to deceive anyone, and no one does.98
It seems fair to conclude that, at least as to Nevada, Florida, the Virgin
Islands, and Idaho, cries of "deception" of the divorcing courts are in-
credibly naive, or else they are hypocritical justifications for attacking
lawyers on the basis of an honorable Canon which has no practical ap-
plication here.9 9 Karl Llewellyn has remarked in this connection:
There are those who refuse to cook evidence, even in divorce cases.
But it is not over healthy to keep in operation any system built on a
theory as to controversy, fault and collusion in which the bulk of
otherwise decent people who have occasion to deal with it, regard
as necessary to cheat. Neither made-to-order evidence nor perjury
are useful social products.100
96Drinker, Problems of Professional Ethics in Matrimonial Litigation, 66 HAv.
L. REv. 443, 464 (1953).
97Compare Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 29 (1955), in which the
Supreme Court invalidated as ultra vires the Virgin Islands statute which provided that
six weeks residence was conclusive evidence of domicile.
9s8Pin, BEYOND THE LA W 48 (1963). Bishop Pike adds: "One difficulty with this
solution is that it is expensive; not everyone can afford a six-week vacation in Reno,
including the inevitable loss involved in playing the one-armed bandits." Ibid. His ap-
praisal is borne out by Drinker, supra note 96, at 462-63; Note, The Role of the Lawyer
in Divorce: Some Ethical Problems, 21 U. Prrr. L. REv. 720, 729 (1960). See also
Alexander, The Follies of Divorce, 36 A.B.A.J. 105, 107 (1950), for a denunciation
of states which "prostitute their honor" by an "amiable inclination" to further divorces
in order to "fatten our marital misfortune." Ingram & Ballard, The Business of Migratory
Divorce in Nevada, 2 LAw & CoNTEm,. Peon. 302, 307 (1935) contains a fascinating
discussion of the practicalities of Nevada business life which underlie its divorce attitude.
99 On the therapeutic value of legal fictions, see p=h., BEYOND = LAw 50 (1963);
Drinker, supra note 96, at 463 n.78.
100 Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce, 33 COL.M. L. Bxv. 249, 281 (1933).
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Nor should modem couples be forced to choose between bigamy and
perjury, or rather, misstatements of fact "which, in any other type of
litigation, would be regarded as perjury, but which is not so regarded
where divorce is involved because ladies and gentlemen indulge in
it,"'o'
A slightly different situation obtains in a state like Alabama, where
the available evidence indicates that the reputation of the state for
"quickies" is the result of an accidentally liberal statute, rather than
of calculated business-getting."2 Section 29 of Title 34 of the Code
of Alabama states that the evidence must show the complainant to be
a resident of Alabama at the time the bill for divorce is filed. No fixed
period is stated. In the 1963 Alabama case of Hilley v. Hilley,
0 3
plaintiff wife flew from Maryland to Birmingham, filed suit the next
day, returned immediately to Maryland, and six months later returned
to stay in a Birmingham motel for a few weeks prior to trial. After the
decree was granted, her husband appealed the issue of residence to
the Supreme Court of Alabama, which affrmed the trial court. The
court held that the question of residence or domicile is mainly one of
intent. Even though the wife had been in Alabama only twenty-four
hours when the bill was filed, it could not be said that the trial court
was palpably wrong, because, if the court has jurisdiction of both
parties, Alabama law requires no specific period of residence. 0 4
In the light of such decisions, it would seem that Alabama's con-
cem over its being "defrauded" by sojourning would-be divorcees is
rapidly dwindling to that of Nevada and Florida. Nevertheless, such
short stays in the divorcing jurisdiction suggest caution. Although
the foreign court is not deceived, the home court is especially likely
to try to overturn an Alabama "one-day" divorce unless it is clearly a
participating divorce. Also a "California underpinning" is virtually
essential. 0 5
Fraud is as reprehensible in California divorce proceedings as in
any other matter in which a court relies on counsel not to falsify a fact
101Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 367 (1948) (dissenting opinion of Frank-
furter, J.).
1
02 For a discussion of the business motives behind the six-week statutes, see
Bergeson, The Divorce Mill Advertises, 2 LAw & CoN rm¢. PToB. 348 (1935).
103 275 Ala. 617, 157 So. 2d 215 (1964).
104 Levy v. Levy, 256 Ala. 629, 56 So. 2d 344 (1952).
105 No cases have been found in California construing a one-day Alabama trip,
but both New Jersey and New York have recently refused to review the evidence of
domiciliary intent, despite stringent allegations of fraud. Hudson v. Hudson, 36 N.J.
549, 178 2d 202 (1962); Genola v. Sharer, 79 N.J. Super. 308, 191 A.2d 491 (Super.
Ct. 1963); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 18 App. Div. 2d 34, 238 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963).
August, 1964] MIGRATORY DIVORCE
material to the case. 06 The California Supreme Court, for example,
has affirmed orders of disbarment for wilfully filing divorce com-
plaints that alleged: (1) more than one year of marriage and thus more
than one year of nonsupport, when the marriage was known to be only
a few months old, 07 and (2) that the service of summons was genuine,
when it was in fact fraudulently drawn up by the attorney.'0 8 Where
there is no fraud, but only an uncertainty in a very confused area of
the law, should attorneys be disciplined as though they had conspired
to tell their courts a falsehood? It is certainly hornbook law that family
lawyers have traditionally owed a much higher duty of disclosure to
the state; but is this imposition justified in the modern world, es-
pecially when attorneys in other areas of the law are held to no such
rigid standards? The reasons usually given for such extreme duty to
disclose in matrimonial matters are the state's interest in the parties'
marriage,:1 9 the belief that spouses do not really know their own in-
terests,110 and the desire to protect children and innocent, deserted
spouses. Throughout this article we have used recrimination and
collusion cases as examples"' because American and English courts
have long required in those cases a high duty of disclosure of events
occurring before the employment of present counsel, though operating
to defeat the client's interest.
Are these policies for an extraordinary duty still sound in reason
and justice? It would seem not. The American courts are slowly re-
placing the principle that a marriage must be kept together at all costs
with a recognition that sometimes divorce may benefit the entire
family group." - At the same time, everyone knows that spouses will
106But cf. People v. Brophy, 49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 120 P.2d 946 (1942) (perjury
conviction reversed-affidavit immaterial to judgment).
107 People ex rel. Burridge v. Pearson, 55 Cal. 472 (1880).
108In re Wharton, 114 Cal. 367, 46 Pac. 172 (1896) (counsel was also charged
with filing a false affidavit of service of summons purporting to bear his own wife's
signature, in his own divorce proceeding. He who acts as his own attorney .... ).
109 "The public policy of California may not permit the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree when the foreign jurisdiction has no legitimate interest in the marital
status of the parties, when the sole purpose of seeking the divorce in a foreign court
is to evade the laws of this state.., or when the divorce is ex parte without reasonable
notice to the defendant." Scott v. Scott, 51 Cal. 2d 249, 256, 331 P.2d 641, 645 (1958)
(concurring opinion of Traynor, J.).
110 See, e.g., DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 240 P.2d 625 (1952); Dickson
v. Dickson, 9 Tenn. (1 Yerg.) 110, 112 (1826).
11 E.g., In re Backes, 16 N.J. 430, 109 A.2d 273 (1954); see text accompanying
notes 51-54 supra.
112 "It is hard to think of a sillier reason for refusal of divorce than the fact that
both spouses desire it and wish the deed to be done with decency. It is hard to see
wisdom in denying divorce unless one of the parties is alleged to be criminal or tortious.
It is hard to approve of conducting an operation of social surgery in the public atmos-
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find a way to untangle unwanted marital bonds if they desire to do so.
California's grounds are as lenient as any state's; only the waiting
period produces mass exodus. Mr. Justice Clark has remarked, "The
only constitutional bugaboo is a judge-made one, domicile.... Divorce
is an intensely practical matter, and if a husband and wife domiciled
in any State want a divorce enough, we all know they can secure it in
several of our states."n s The authors submit that all of the above rea-
sons indicate that the standard of disclosure of the facts surrounding
previous sister state divorces should be no different from that generally
required of counsel. It is no more reasonable to require a wife's at-
torney to explain that he doesn't think she was domiciled in Alabama
when she got her divorce ten years ago, than it would be to require a
defense attorney to disclose that he thinks his client is guilty. Many
other examples of touchy areas come to mind. Why should the family
lawyer, in dealing with a comparatively private matter, have to disclose
more against his client's interest than a tax attorney, who is represent-
ing a man against his government? It is probably due largely to these
archaic, unduly rigid standards that family lawyers still are second-
class in the eyes of conservative bar associations. Let us review some of
the anomalies which arise when the family lawyer is compelled to lay
before the court everything against, as well as everything for, a client's
position.
(1) Confidential communications. Usually the client's earlier ca-
prices in other states come out in casual conversation, as part of the
background of the matter counsel is presently investigating. The at-
torney has a duty to preserve the confidences of his client acquired by
virtue of the attorney-client relationship.1 4 Even the ABA Committee
has held that this duty must ordinarily be paramount to that of dis-
closing former clients' misrepresentation of domicile to the lawyer's
own home court. In 1944 the Committee held that an attorney con-
sulted on a divorce, who finds that the client has not the requisite resi-
dence in the lawyer's state, and who later hears that the client has
seen another lawyer who does not know of the non-residence, must not
reveal what he knows to court or attormey." 5 The "fraud" is not fraud
phere of the prize ring. The legal attitude of some of our states is so far from en-
lightened that among persons of refinement and decency there has been wide readiness
to overlook the fraudulent pretensions in the way of avoidance by the Nevada alterna-
ive." Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HAIv. L. REv. 930, 990-91 (1945).
1l3 Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1955) (dissenting
opinion).
114 ABA Opinion 216 (1941); ABA Opinion 250 (1943); ABA Opinion 274 (1946);
ABA, C 'oNs or Pno 'soNAL ETmcs Canon 37 (1908).
115 ABA Opinion 268 (1944).
August, 1964] MIGRATORY DIVORCE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
at all, but merely a refusal to relitigate on his own motion a matter
previously determined in another court, usually before the attorney
became connected with the cause. It would seem unrealistic as well as
unfair to require the confidentiality of these communications to be
violated.
(2) The constitutional protection against self-incrimination. As we
shall see in Griffith v. State Bar,"6 as long as the state is able to
prosecute for bigamy, a court is forcing a litigant to incriminate him-
self if it compels him to discuss in detail facts which might indicate a
lack of jurisdiction in the prior, divorcing court. The answer seems
obvious.
(3) Hearsay and the client's conclusions. Often the remarks of the
client are merely his own conclusions ("I probably wasn't there long
enough," or "Mr. Lawyer, somebody told me that divorce I got is no
good"). Ordinarily, counsel was not present at the divorce, or even
privy to the facts at the time. There is even less reason to compel him
to use this incompetent testimony against his client's interests than
there is to bar, as we do, his using hearsay and opinions in favor of his
client.
(4) Estoppel. Under the rules discussed in more detail below, even
strangers, let alone the other spouse, may be estopped to challenge an
"otherwise invalid" foreign decree. This principle must also prevent
counsel from raising evidence in derogation of the decree, since his
client could never overturn the decree, even if he wanted to.
(5) Bona fide controversy and arguments. We have been discussing
"invalid" foreign decrees as though they always came in black and
white. Of course most divorce decrees come in various shades of
passionate grey. How is the attorney to judge whether he must betray
his client, when even the United States Supreme Court cannot agree
where the line ought to be drawn? In the light (or dark) of recent case
law, can it ever be justly said that "it would be obvious to any lawyer
that the decree was invalid"? The law in the client's home state may
change; he may move to a jurisdiction which will uphold the decree, or
it may be upheld for some purposes but not others, or it may be imper-
vious to attack by some persons and not by others. Surely this is contro-
versy enough.
(6) Full faith and credit ruling in the trial court. Finally, what
should a hapless attorney do when, despite all of the explaining he
can muster, the trial court elects to uphold a sister state divorce under
the full faith and credit clause? Surely in such a situation it would be
116 40 Cal. 2d 470, 254 P.2d 22 (1953).
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outrageous to say that the decree is "invalid," since a court of com-
petent jurisdiction in the attorney's home state declared it valid. Yet as
we shall see, a California attorney was recently suspended under just
such circumstances.
The peril to the lawyer in his daily practice is greater to the man
whose tastes do not run to domestic relations law. The tax counsellor,
the commercial practitioner, the business lawyer who never goes to
the divorce court is frequently the first to be asked for advice by the
long-standing client who can afford the expense incident to migration,
or who cannot survive publicity in the local press. He is most likely to
be the one consulted by the clergyman, the public official, or the pro-
fessor, where discreet handling is absolutely essential to the client's
professional existence. Similarly, even the lawyer who has wide ex-
perience in divorce practice, and who might feel that he had a grasp
of the intricacies of the "validity" of an out-of-state divorce decree,
would realize that no obvious answers are to be found if he were to
work out the problems in the detail set out in this paper.
In sum, the authors conclude that there is no more reason for de-
manding disclosure of every possible defect in a prior decree, than
there is for demanding disclosure against the client's interest in any
other type of case. Such a requirement is unfair to counsel and client.
It serves no significant social purpose and leads to unwarranted dis-
respect for an area of law practice that is demanding enough without
the ecclesiastical court burdens of past centuries. Fraud in family law
is no more tolerable than in juvenile, tax, or criminal matters, but it
should be defined and policed no more strictly.
Although several American cases have touched upon the attorney's
ethical problems in migratory divorce, there appears to be only one
California case in this important area, Griffith v. State Bar. In 1953 the
California Supreme Court imposed a two year suspension on an at-
torney. Griffith was charged on three counts. The first count, alleging
that he had solicited business through a capper, wa dismissed by the
supreme court as not proven and we do not discuss it here. The second
count charged him with misleading a court concerning a Texas divorce
decree. The supreme court held the evidence on this count sufficient
to sustain a two year suspension. The third count charged him with
moral turpitude and dishonesty in obtaining a Texas divorce for a
woman not domiciled in Texas and with advising her that the decree
was valid. The supreme court discussed, but expressly declined to rule
upon, the sufficiency of the evidence adduced to support this charge
and upon the propriety of Griffith's conduct under the circumstances.
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According to their testimony in Los Angeles before the local ad-
ministrative committee of the State Bar, Gladys and Dale Kelley had
been married in 1944 in Omaha. They had moved to Los Angeles in
1947 and had lived in California ever since. They separated in June
1950; Dale sued for divorce in Los Angeles in July 1950 and received
an interlocutory decree which granted him custody of the two chi-
dren.
Gladys, wishing to marry again as soon as possible, felt that she
was unable to wait a year for the California decree to become final.
In June 1950 she consulted Mr. Willie Hawkins in Los Angeles who,
though not licensed to practice law, promised to procure a Texas
divorce for her through P. J. Hemphill, a Dallas lawyer. Gladys stated
that she paid Hawkins 120 dollars. Gladys later testified that she had
never been to Texas, and had not gone there for the divorce, which
apparently was granted on a deposition sent to her by Hemphill, as
authorized by Texas law. The Texas decree, dated September 15, 1950,
included three misstatements of fact: (1) that she had been a resident
of Texas for one year and of the county for six months; (2) that there
were no children of the marriage; and (3) that the defendant, Dale
Kelley, had waived service and appearance in the Texas action.
Armed with this Texas decree, Gladys Kelley married Duane Van-
derbush, a seaman, in Los Angeles on November 4, 1950. At about that
time she first consulted Griffith in hopes of obtaining a modification
of the California custody award. Griffith agreed to represent her in that
action. During the course of several office visits, Griffith learned of the
Texas decree, and he may have advised Gladys and Duane that the
Texas decree was "invalid," because Gladys had not been domiciled in
Texas when the decree was granted, and because Dale had not waived
service. Apparently Griffith meant that it was his prediction that a
California court would, if asked to reexamine the decree, refuse full
faith and credit on the ground that Gladys had not been in Texas and
Dale had not waived service. Griffith could not have unequivocally
concluded that the decree was invalid, since a sister state divorce
decree, valid on its face, must be presumed valid until declared void
by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the burden of proof rests
heavily upon the attacker,"-' and Gladys would undoubtedly have been
estopped to attack the decree.
Later, while Duane was at sea, Dale Kelley signed a bigamy com-
plaint against Gladys in the office of the Los Angeles District At-
torney. Gladys later testified that Dale had threatened her with a
117 See note 16 supra.
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bigamy prosecution unless she abandoned her custody fight. Gladys
retained Griffith to represent her on the bigamy charges and was re-
leased on bail. Acting on a suggestion of an assistant district attorney,
Griffith advised her that by suing to annul her second marriage the
Vanderbushes could demonstrate that Gladys had in good faith be-
lieved her prior marriage ended." 8 Griffith thereupon filed suit for
annulment on behalf of Duane Vanderbush against Gladys. Griffith
was, therefore, simultaneously representing Duane in the annulment
matter and Gladys in the bigamy proceeding, with the full knowledge
and consent of both parties. As a matter of strategy he had recom-
mended instituting the annulment proceedings to help Gladys' bigamy
defense, but he found himself in an adverse posture to her in the an-
nulment action. Griffith later testified that he realized there was a
potential conflict of interests, but that it did not violate the canons of
professional ethics since each client knew all of the facts, and con-
sented to his representing the other."9 Whichever way the annulment
proceeding came out, Gladys' bigamy defense would be helped. If
the judge held the second marriage valid, this would indicate that
she had had a reasonable belief that it was valid, 20 while if the Van-
derbush marriage were held invalid, Gladys would still have made a
good faith effort to correct her marital status.
On January 19, 1951, Griffith represented Gladys at her pre-
liminary hearing on the bigamy charge. The annulment action came
on for trial on March 12, 1951, before Judge Henry Willis,121 in Los
Angeles. Because the exact words of the colloquy between Griffith
and Judge Willis are so important to an understanding of the supreme
court's interpretation of the attorney's "duty to disclose," and because
the supreme court's per curiam opinion does not give the exact words,
we reprint the short transcript.
18 It has been suggested that this technique "should be equally prophylactic
whether the divorce [or annulment] were granted, or were denied on the ground that
the marriage had already been severed." Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HARv. L.
REv. 930, 1004 (1945).
119 "It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." ABA, CANONS OF PaoFEssioNAL
ETcs Canon 6 (1908). See generally DRuNan ,eI GAL ETHIcs 103-30 (1953).
120 Compare People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956), which over-
ruled prior decisions that a reasonable belief of prior divorce is not a defense to a
bigamy charge. Vogel was not the law in 1951, but a finding of reasonableness might
have been a mitigating circumstance. Also, a final decision of a California court uphold-
ing the out-of-state decree might have been res judicata on that issue in the bigamy
prosecution.
121 Judge Willis, now deceased, was reputed to be one of California's leading experts
on annulments.
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Direct examination of Duane Vanderbush by his attorney, Mr. Griffith:
Q. Did you enter into a ceremony of marriage with the defend-
ant .,. on the 4th day of November 1950? A. Yes.
Q. At the time of the ceremony was Mrs. Vanderbush divorced
from her former husband? A. No, she wasn't.
Q. Did you believe that she had been divorced from her former
husband? A. I did.
Mr. Griffith: That is all from this witness, your Honor.
The Court: What have you now to prove the former marriage?
Mr. Griffith: I have Mrs. Vanderbush here, your Honor. It is a
case in which Mrs. Vanderbush had relied upon a Texas decree of
divorce.
The Court: Did you try to get the record?
Mr. Griffith: I have the record of the Texas decree, but that is
being questioned.
The Court: Let's have it.
Mr. Griffith: That was prior to the date of this marriage, your
Honor. There has been some question as to the validity of the Texas
decree.
The Court: Who questioned it?
Mr. Griffith: The former husband.
The Court: His questioning doesn't amount to anything.
Mr. Griffith: I quite agree with your Honor, except for the fact
that a bigamy complaint was filed at the instigation of the
former husband and that is now pending. But it is my opinion and
will be my position throughout the entire matter that that decree is
valid on its face. But at the same time we are confronted with that
problem there, the bigamy action pending, and in order to show the
good faith, not only of this plaintiff but of the defendant, Mrs.
Vanderbush, we have instituted these proceedings. The decree of
annulment, your Honor, is not the wish of either of the parties of
this action, but it is brought about through pressure of this former
husband contesting the validity of the Texas decree.
The Court: Well, on September 15, 1950, this divorce was granted
in Texas dissolving the bonds of marriage between Gladys A. Kelley
and Dale Kelley. Now, Duane Donald Vanderbush married Gladys
Kelley in Long Beach on November 4, 1950.
Mr. Griffith: That is correct.
The Court: That is a couple or three months after this decree of
divorce was entered.
Mr. Griffith: That is correct, your Honor.
The Court: The Constitution of the United States says that I
have to give that full faith and credit on its face.
Mr. Griffith: That is correct.
The Court: That proves that the lady was divorced and that she
was free to marry this man.
Mr. Griffith: Thank you very much, your Honor.
The Court: Is that all you wanted?
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Mr. Griffith: Yes, that is all.
The Court: The adjudication is the plaintiff is not entitled to
have the marriage annulled on the ground stated.
Mr. Griffith: That [sic] you very much. That is what we wanted,
your Honor .... 22
Four months later, in July 1951, Griffith returned to Judge Willis
with affidavits pointing out the three erroneous statements recited in
Gladys" Texas decree (Texas residence, no children, and Dale's waiver
of service), and moved to set aside the judgment. The judge refused
and announced in court to Griffith:
There is no need to argue it Mr. Griffith. This is a valid decree of
the Texas court. Now I have read all of your affidavits that you have
filed, but what has that got to do with the decree of the Texas
court?
1 28
Apparently upon complaint by Dale Kelley, a local administrative
committee investigated Griffith's representation of the Vanderbushes.
After four long hearings, the committee (and later the Board of Gov-
ernors) found that Griffith "sought to and did mislead the judge of
the Superior Court in connection with the representation of Duane
Donald Vanderbush in the annulment action tried before said
judge"' 2 4
On Griffith's petition for review, the California Supreme Court con-
cluded per curiam that:
There can be no doubt but that petitioner misled the court be-
cause he knew that the Texas decree was invalid for the reason that
both Mr. and Mrs. Kelley were in California and were not domiciled
in Texas at the time action for divorce was commenced. There was
no reasonable basis for him to assert that he could not tell whether
the Texas decree was void due to the complexity of the law on the
validity of out-of-state divorces because in this case it would be
obvious to any lawyer that the decree was invalid.... It is patent
that he did not want an annulment but rather a declaration of the
validity of the Texas decree and he achieved that result by leading
the court to believe that the Texas decree was valid when he knew
it was not. The second count presents, therefore, grounds for dis-
ciplinary action....
In view of the previous record of petitioner ... we believe the
punishment recommended is supportable because of petitioners
conduct as charged in count two. Therefore, it is ordered that peti-
tioner be, and he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law for
122 Record, pp. 34-36.
123 Record, p. 251.
1
2 4 Record, p. 4.
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a period of two years, this order to become effective 30 days from
the Ming of this decision' 25
The authors confess amazement that an attorney should lose his
license for two years for not challenging a California court's decision
that a Texas decree was entitled to full faith and credit in this state.
The question which seems most immediate is whether the law of
recognition of out-of-state divorce decrees in California is so clear and
certain that "it would be obvious to any lawyer that the decree was
invalid." A partial explanation may lie in the fact that throughout the
proceedings before the State Bar, and even in his brief before the
supreme court, Griffith's attorney conceded that the Texas decree was
invalid, 2 6 and that petitioner knew it was invalid. 27
To understand just how crucial the added information Griffith had
received from Gladys Vanderbush was to the "validity" of the Texas
decree, and thus to the annulment action, and thus to Griffith's "mis-
leading" the court, let us inquire whether there is a bona fide question
of validity. Then let us add the facts of no Texas domicile and no waiver
of service and ask again whether it can truly be said that "it would be
obvious to any lawyer that the decree was invalid." We will not be
stating what the law of California is today; we are rather concentrating
on discovering whether the law is really so clear and certain that law-
yers could not ethically disagree.
The Decree on Its Face
First, it would appear that every lawyer is justified in relying on
a decree regularly pronounced by a competent court of a sister state,
if it is valid on its face. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1913
provides as follows:
The effect of a judicial record of a sister State is the same in this
State as in the State where it was made....
Similarly, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1963(16) states
a rebuttable presumption:
That a court or judge, acting .as such, whether in this State or any
12540 Cal. 2d at 475-76, 254 P.2d at 25-26. (Emphasis added.) Griffith had pre-
viously been disciplined for misappropriation of funds. Griffith v. State Bar, 26 Cal. 2d
273, 158 P.2d 1 (1945). Although it is customary to consider previous discipline in
determining the penalty, McGregor v. State Bar, 24 Cal. 2d 283, 148 P.2d 865 (1944),
the court should never do so in setting the standard of conduct. Since it is not correct
to declare the conduct of one already disciplined to be unethical if the same conduct
by a lawyer without a record is not improper, we must conclude that the supreme court
deemed Griffith's conduct, at least in the Vanderbush matter, disciplinable.
126 Brief for Petitioner, p. 21.
127 Id. at 12, 17 (semble).
[VCol. 16THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
other state or country, was acting in the lawful exercise of his juris-
diction;
And California Code of Civil Procedure section 1963(17) provides:
That a judicial record, when not conclusive, does still correctly
determine or set forth the rights of the parties.
These presumptions should be especially applicable in the area of
domestic relations, where there is a vital social need to have a reason-
able certainty of ascertaining marital status.12 8 They have been invoked
again and again in California courts, and the United States Supreme
Court has confirmed their application to interstate divorce cases.
129
Second, both the full faith and credit clause and the California
cases establish a heavy burden of proof upon the party attacking the
decree. s0 Similarly, California cases decided both before and after the
enactment in 1949 of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act8 are in
accord with the Williams II requirement that the assailant. must
shoulder the burden of proof.
Third, there is no federal constitutional compulsion to refuse to
recognize an out-of-state divorce, even if it can be clearly established
that the parties were not domiciled in the divorcing state at the time
the decree was rendered; threfore, a California judge of competent
jurisdiction remains constitutionally free to give full faith and credit
to a foreign ex parte decree whatever its faults.
8 2
Fourth, two routine applications of the doctrine of estoppel would
have prevented an attack on the Vanderbush decree, thus serving as
additional grounds for Judge Willis' decision. First, even though the
Texas decree was probably ex parte, Gladys could not properly have
testified in the annulment as to any facts tending to impugn the
decree, since she had procured it. Not only would such evidence not
have altered Judge Willis' decision (as witness his later refusal to
modify it), but Gladys would not be heard to question the decree
which she obtained.'33 Second, Duane Vanderbush (whom Griffith
128 Scott v. Scott, 51 Cal. 2d 249, 331 P.2d 641 (1958).
129See note 15 supra.
13o See note 16 supra.
131 CAL. Civ. CoDE §§ 150-50.4.
182 Not only is he constitutionally free to do so, he must give it recognition if
attacked on any ground but lack of domicile. Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S.
226 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). He must recognize
it despite defects of domicile if it is a "participating" divorce decree. See text accom-
panying notes 8-11 supra.
138Watson v. Watson, 39 Cal. 2d 305, 246 P.2d 19 (1952); Rediker v. Rediker,
35 Cal. 2d 796, 221 P.2d 1 (1950). Not even the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act
will defeat such estoppel. Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal. 2d 497, 505, 261 P.2d 269, 273
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was representing in the annulment action) not only had no standing
to object to Gladys' prior divorce,8 4 but also was estopped from intro-
ducing evidence attacking Gladys' divorce, since he had helped her
procure it.13 Because of this further estoppel Judge Willis could not
have found the decree invalid no matter what further report Griffith
made to him concerning the Texas decree. Finally, the Vanderbush
decree recited that the defendant had waived service, thus, at least
on its face, bringing into play the rule of Sherrer v. Sherrer86 that
a defendant who participated in a divorce is forever barred under the
full faith and credit clause from relitigating the question of Texas
jurisdiction. 117 Since California has held that participation within the
Sherrer rule includes submitting to the jurisdiction of the foreign
court,18 the waiver of service on its face prevented the application
of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act'89 by requiring full faith and
credit to the sister state decree.
It would be fair to conclude that the Texas decree had at least
these elements of validity: (a) it appeared valid on its face; (b) like
any other judgment, it was entitled to the presumption in favor of its
validity; (c) a "heavy burden" rested on the assailant; (d) it was in
fact held valid by a court of competent jurisdiction both before and
after "full disclosure"; and (e) at least two applications of the doctrine
of estoppel would prevent any California court from entertaining evi-
dence of its validity. Against this array can be mounted only the pre-
sumption set out in the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, which would
at most merely balance the above considerations. The constitutionality
of California Code of Civil Procedure section 150.2, which sets out
(1953); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Gordon, 116 Cal. App. 2d 681, 685, 254 P.2d 644,
647 (1953). See generally 2 F m Lmy AwE § 32.21; Comment, 42 CALwF. L. Ray.
503 (1954); Note, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 881 (1955); Note, 27 So. CAL. L. REv. 475
(1954).
184 Mumma v. Mumma, 86 Cal. App. 2d 133, 194 P.2d 24 (1948). Contra, Rudnick
v. Rudnick, 131 Cal. App. 2d 227, 280 P.2d 96 (1955); see Note, 7 HAsTmNs L.J. 317
(1956).
135 Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal. 2d 497, 261 P.2d 269 (1953); Spellens v. Spellens,
49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957); see Note, 46 CxirF. L. R-v. 474 (1958); Note,
10 H&ASNcs L.J. 96 (1958); of. Estate of Davis, 38 Cal. App. 2d 579, 101 P.2d 761
(1940).
186 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
13
7 See note 10 supra.
138 Heuer v. Heuer, 33 Cal. 2d 268, 201 P.2d 385 (1949). There is a presumption
in California that the defendant in an out-of-state proceeding did appear generally.
Craney v. Low, 46 Cal. 2d 757, 298 P.2d 860 (1956). See also 2 FA.my LAwYE
§ 32.12.
'3 9 See generally ERENzWEIG, § 75; 3 WrrXI, SUMMArY oF CAI.rwoRmN._ LAw
2608-09 (7th ed. 1960); 2 FAMILy LA_ §§ 32.8, 32.21.
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certain conditions which are "prima facie evidence" of lack of out-of-
state domicile, has yet to be considered; but Rice v. Rice,140 suggests
that this presumption of invalidity may itself violate the full faith and
credit clause. The Court based its approval of a Connecticut finding
of no Nevada domicile upon the fact that the attacker had fairly met
what the Court referred to as his proper burden of proof. 41 It follows
that it was not "obvious to any lawyer that the decree was invalid," and
there was a good faith basis for Griffith's contention that it was valid.
The holding in Griffith concerning the Vanderbush matter raises
many puzzling questions of legal ethics. However, there appear to be
two key questions. What duty has the California family lawyer to re-
examine the material facts behind out-of-state divorce decrees pre-
sented to him by clients who wish to act in California in reliance on
them? Secondly, if there be no such general duty, is a duty neverthe-
less imposed should the lawyer happen to hear any casual remarks of
clients which might cast doubt on the jurisdictional findings of the
foreign divorce court?
The Griffith case does not pass upon whether the California lawyer
is entitled to give full faith and credit in his office. There is no more
justification for making such an inquiry mandatory than there is for
requiring every attorney to demand proof that his clients' property
has not been stolen from someone else. A state like New Jersey, which,
as we have seen,142 imposes extremely rigid standards on lawyers con-
nected with divorce proceedings to prevent divorce at whatever cost,
might find some justification for such a requirement. But California's
renunciation of this philosophy in DeBurgh v. DeBurgh48 would sug-
gest that it is not only fair but consonant with our public policy to
allow attorneys to extend the same credence to jurisdictional findings
in sister state divorce decrees that they are permitted to extend in
every other area of the law.
We conclude that the duty of the California lawyer should not in-
clude an obligation to inquire anew into the facts serving as a basis
for jurisdiction to divorce, and a fortiori, that if he knows nothing of
any complications, he has no duty to reveal them to a California court
in subsequent proceedings.
A no less important problem is whether the incidental mention of
facts which might mitigate against the decree creates an affirmative
140 336 U.S. 674 (1949).
141 See Marsh, The Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, 24 WAsu. L. REV. 259
(1949).
142 See text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
143 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
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duty to investigate or to disclose them to the California court. Al-
though we have mentioned it before, it is important to keep in mind
the split-level character of the applicable law. Since a decree may be
"invalid" yet unassailable, 44 talk about "validity" is often meaningless
unless we ask "valid for what purpose," and "as to whom"? The most
that an opinion of "validity" can mean in this context is a prediction
that a California court will treat the decree as effective to define
marital status in this State. In the Vanderbush matter, this is exactly
what happened in Judge Willis' court.
Did Lloyd Griffith have a duty to volunteer to Judge Willis what
his client had said to him concerning residence and waiver? It seems
at best anomalous to hold that Griffith misled the judge, when the
judge obviously was incapable of being either led or misled.145 Just as
it would have been impossible for Griffith, unlicensed in Texas, to have
been absolutely certain of the validity of a Texas decree, so he could
not be absolutely certain of its invalidity, or be expected to act en-
tirely on the premise that the decree was unquestionably invalid.
There are other reasons, however, for dismay at the Court's con-
clusion. We have discussed them in their general context above and
will now briefly apply them to the facts of the Griffith case.
First, does it not violate Gladys' attorney-client privilege for her
attorney to state in court, even on his own initiative any facts revealed
to him in the course of his representation of her on the charge of
bigamy? Second, the statements were merely Gladys' remarks con-
cerning her residence; the attorney never had personal knowledge of
the truth of those statements, and not even at the State Bar hearings
was there any direct testimony by Dale Kelley or anyone else tending
to establish that he had not appeared or been served in the Texas pro-
ceeding. Thus, Gladys' remarks on this subject, bearing in mind that
they come from a background of many consultations with Griffith, ap-
pear to be far from absolute proof to Griffith that the decree was void.
Third, and even more important, Griffith would have been in-
criminating his own client if he had introduced into the annulment
record any evidence tending to impugn the Texas decree. 46 The
144 See note 69 supra.
'45 "It is no secret to the Bar that the Court ir which the action was being tried
is not a forum in which it is easy for an attorney to oppose an attitude assumed by the
judge." Brief for Petitioner, p. 29.
146 This argument was one of the few raised by counsel for Griffith in his petition for
review. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 18-21. In general the brief consisted of abject admissions
of guilt, which in the author's opinion were unjustified, and probably resulted in a less
thorough examination of the very difficult underlying problems this article has been
exploring than might have been hoped for.
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District Attorney could have used such evidence in the later criminal
trial even if Judge Willis ruled (as he did) that such evidence could
not affect the validity of the Texas decree. The supreme court at-
tempted to dispose of this argument by stating that:
that is not a satisfactory explanation because it would appear that in
a sense he was representing conflicting interests, that is, Mrs. Kelley
in the bigamy case and Vanderbush in the annulment proceeding.147
It appears that the court is punishing Griffith with suspension only be-
cause of his representing conflicting interests. Whatever the wisdom of
the dual representation, it constitutes no basis for suspension since the
two clients consented.148 Given the complicating factor of conflicting
interests, should not the court have considered his duty when in court
he was confronted with the dilemma of whether to incriminate his
bigamy client? As Griffith later testified:
[M]y mind went into a whirl. I had a duty to disclose to the Court
the fact that there was a Texas decree which I felt under the circum-
stances was void and I had over here a client.., who was facing
bigamy prosecution and whom I had to protect against self-in-
crimination.1
49
Finally, Judge Willis refused to hear more on the subject at the
time of the original hearing; his later denial shows he would not have
altered his conclusion no matter what evidence was offered. The
transcript demonstrates that Griffith pointed out all of the important
problems, that the decree was being questioned by Dale Kelley, and
that Gladys was being prosecuted for bigamy despite her Texas decree.
The transcript indicates that the judge was abrupt, reached conclu-
sions quickly, interrupted counsel, and made it clear that he thought
the matter settled. In short, for purposes of discipline, the California
court gave substance to the distinction between, "valid" and "invalid
but unassailable" divorces, even though it recognizes no such distinc-
lion in the substantive law of divorce jurisdiction.
The Griffith case also raised another important ethical question on
which the supreme court declined to pass. Count three against Lloyd
Griffith condemned him "for falsely advising his client Alva Porter
McDonald that a Texas divorce decree obtained for her by petitioner
through [P. J.] Hemphill, an attorney in Texas, was valid."'8 0 The evi-
dence showed that Alva had been born and had grown up in Texas,' 5'
14740 Cal. 2d at 475, 254 P.2d at 25.
148 Note 119 supra.
149 Record, p. 245.
150 40 Cal. 2d at 475, 254 P.2d at 25.
151 Record, pp. 96-100.
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that she married Carol in 1942, that they separated in 1944 and he
remarried, and that Alva had left Texas in 1945 for Los Angeles. She
last heard from Carol in a letter from Arkansas. His family resided
in Houston. She came to Griffith in 1949 to clear up her marital status,
since she had recently married Orrin McDonald, but had not, to her
knowledge, been divorced from Carol. Griffith collected a fee for the
divorce from Alva which he forwarded to Hemphill, but he acted as
an intermediary between Hemphill and Alva McDonald.152
There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether Griffith was
merely a conduit through which Alva and Hemphill corresponded, or
whether Alva retained Griffith to obtain the divorce. It is a fair reading
of the evidence to say that Griffith transmitted the papers and fee, but
confined his personal involvement to comments on the probable effect
of the decree.
Was it Griffith's procuring of the Texas decree, his informing Alva
that the decree might be 'legal," 153 or was it both that constituted
moral turpitude? Since the supreme court expressly declined to pass
judgment on the ethical problems raised by count three, we cannot
be sure what its position would be on these problems.
The problem raised by count three is how far may a California.
lawyer associate himself with an out-of-state attorney in arranging a
foreign divorce for a client who appears to be domiciled in California?
It does not appear to have been seriously contended in California that
the mere arranging of a divorce in another jurisdiction for a client
whom the lawyer believes to be domiciled here, and whom the lawyer
has reason to believe will return to the state, is in itself an "evasion"
of our laws. Similarly, it appears that the California lawyer has not
only the right, but the affirmative duty, to inform his client of all of
the possible ways in which the law will uphold his acts or carry out
his desires.5 As we have seen, estoppel, res judicata, and "participat-
ing" divorces will often effect the parties' desires despite "state in-
terest."
Applying these principles to the present facts let us inquire whether
Griffith was guilty of moral turpitude by involving himself in Alva's
152 Hemphiill was a licensed Texas attorney who had satisfactorily handled a
previous real property problem for Griffith. They had apparently never met, nor was
Grifflth aware of the divorce Hemphill had obtained for the Vanderbushes at the time
Hemphill arranged for it.
153 Despite the State Bar's statement, Brief for Respondent, p. 3, there is no evidence
that Griffith stated that the decree would be "valid" or "invalid"--only 'legal."
254ABA, CANoNs or PnorEssoNAL ETHIcs Canon 8 (1908); see Dnumn?, LwAL
ETmcs 102-03 (1953).
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Texas divorce to the extent he did, or by advising Alva that her decree
would be 'legal."
Alva testified without contradiction that she told Griffith she
wanted a quick divorce, but could not afford to leave the state for
any length of time. She suggested that perhaps her continuous Texas
residence before separation would give her a sufficient nexus with
Texas. Griffith thereupon corresponded with Hemphill. Hemphill ad-
vised Griffith that since the last "matrimonial domicile" was Texas, and
her first husband was in Texas, Alva could obtain a divorce there on
her deposition. Hemphill made up the papers and sent them to Grif-
fith, who forwarded them without inspection or comment to Alva.
It appears that at no time did Griffith pretend to practice Texas
law. He told Alva that he had previously worked with Hemphill; he
arranged for the two to exchange the papers; and he relied on Hemp-
hill's professional judgment concerning Texas law. True, Griffith did
not independently examine the Texas case and statute law, but he
never affected to have done so; he consulted a Texas practitioner and
informed his client of the results, stating to her that based upon what
the Texas lawyer told him, he believed that in Texas the domicile for
purposes of divorce jurisdiction remains that of the husband, especially
if he is the deserted spouse.155 Whether this analysis of the substantive
law was right or wrong, the supreme court should not find that such a
lawyer was guilty of moral turpitude, or even that "petitioner... knew
that the Texas decree was invalid."
156
It may be that Griffith can be explained by suggesting that the
court was more willing to find Griffith guilty because of his prior
suspension. .5 If this explanation should be correct, then the authors
express concern that the official reports now contain such an unin-
tended castigation of a California attorney's conduct in two very
complex, yet common, migratory divorce situations. Apparently the
court intended every word it used, and genuinely felt that Griffith's
conduct in the Vanderbush matter merited discipline; his association
with Mrs. McDonald and Hemphill was deemed questionable enough
to be discussed at length'58 without resolving it in his favor. There-
fore, California family lawyers, and all other lawyers who have oc-
155 This was the rule for forty years under Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562
(1906).
15 40 Cal. 2d at 475, 254 P.2d at 25. (Emphasis added.)
157 See note 125 supra.
158 The court had evidence enough on the first count to discipline Griffith, with-
out discussing the Vanderbush or McDonald matters, had it desired to reach that result.
40 Cal. 2d at 472, 254 P.2d at 23.
August, 1964] MIGRATORY DIVORCE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
casion to consider the possible California effects of a foreign divorce
decree, had better take salutory warning. It would appear that in
Griffith v. State Bar the supreme court has established extremely strict
standards of volunteering the disclosure of all hearsay information
that might help strike down a foreign divorce decree valid on its face,
even if the disclosure would send the client to prison for bigamy. The
court also discussed at length, but declined to decide, whether a Cali-
fornia practitioner is guilty of moral turpitude if he transmits papers
and fee to an out-of-state attorney and informs his client that, accord-
ing to the other attorney's understanding of the sister state divorce
law, the divorce would be legal" in that state.
Let us hope that the supreme court did not mean all that it said in
Griffith v. State Bar. Let us further hope that the supreme court will
not in the future adhere to the rigid standard laid down in Griffith. It
is submitted that such a standard is neither just nor practicable. We
can take some solace in the fact that the case has been cited in Cali-
fornia only once, and then on an evidence point.15 9
Practical Considerations
What ought the lawyer, specialist or not, do in these delicate
situations? First, a "California underpinning" is essential. Where coun-
sel knows that clients have roots in their California community, and
plan to return, a quiet California proceeding will start the one year
running, and will guarantee that no one will ever question the validity
of the action. Adequate provision must be made for children, custody,
support, and property settlement. Only after this has been worked out
can the parties afford to consider the frills of an out-of-state action. If
the clients can afford it, a one-day Alabama proceeding may be suf-
ficient (both parties appearing), otherwise the conventional six weeks
in Reno or Sun Valley will be more appropriate. In the light of the
above discussion, it would seem eminently proper for counsel to recom-
mend counsel in the sister state. This out-of-state decree is the one
which will protect the family name, the children, and the professional
associations of the clients; for the parties may "remarry" in the out-of-
state jurisdiction as soon as the decree has been entered. Of course
the California attorney will be prudent to act as though the decree is
a legal nullity, whether or not it is one. In California, Civil Code sec-
tion 61(1) nullifies any marriage entered into after an interlocutory
decree and before the entry of the final California decree. It will be
necessary for the couples to go to a clergyman after the one year has
169 Webb v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 2d 866, 871, 306 P.2d 458, 464 (1957).
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expired, and after the final decree has been entered in the California
action, to have a quiet ceremony. The lawyer should consider it his
professional duty to enter the final decree, with accompanying affi-
davits, as soon as possible and not rely on his clients to return for it.
If at all possible, the attorney should avoid out-of-state proceed-
ings in which the defendant does not make a general appearance. If
such proceedings are absolutely necessary, he should underpin the
foreign decree by following the appropriate publication procedure in
California. We have seen how much more precarious is the legal status
of out-of-state ex parte decrees, but more importantly, they breed
family confusion and strife. Desertion to obtain a divorce is no more
satisfactory a solution to marital discord than is desertion in its usual
setting. However difficult it may be to work out a satisfactory agree-
ment over property settlement and child custody, such an agreement
is far preferable to the bitterness, expense, uncertainty, and litigation
which so often results from unilateral divorce. When counsel fail to
arrive at a settlement both sides can live with before they tackle the
additional burdens of an out-of-state divorce, they are inviting a per-
sonal share of the ousted spouse's bitterness and wrath..The best way
to solve conflicts problems is to avoid them, and the best way to avoid
State Bar complaints is to remove or alleviate the emotional rancor
which instigates them.
As for mail-order divorces, counsel must remonstrate as strongly
as possible against them, but it would seem unquestionably proper to
inform his clients of just what effects the courts have given to them.
At the very least, counsel should insist that they be participating
divorces, with both parties present; this factor may be sufficient to in-
voke an estoppel, even though Sherrer and Johnson do not protect
them under the full faith and credit clause because they are extra-
national.
Summary and Conclusions
With the law of migratory divorce so uncertain, it is unfair to re-
quire of family lawyers an extremely high duty to disclose information
adverse to their client's interests. It is best that citizens should solve
their legal dilemmas in the state of which they are permanent in-
habitants, but in the light of the restrictive divorce laws of some states,
and frequently because of publicity that could wreck a career, out-of-
state divorces are a necessary aspect of our lives. Lawyers should not
be castigated or criticized merely for taking part in this social blood-
letting; their standards should be no stricter than those of their
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brethren at the bar engaged in other specialties. Professional work-
manship will require that the most conservative and pessimistic view
be taken of foreign decrees, and this will require proper California
underpinning; but professional sanctions ought not to descend with
harder blows on attorneys in this field than in any other. Legal fic-
tions have their place in family law, just as m ejectment or trover.
Genuine fraud ought to be punished but not a good faith attempt to
walk the tightrope between a client's interest and the disclosing of all
of his possible follies.
Like the District of Columbia judge who denied recognition of a
Nevada decree where the husband and wife had sojourned together in
Reno for six weeks by remarking that he would not permit the pair to
"litigate by day and copulate by mght, rater sese and pendente lite,"
we may not personally approve of Reno divorces; but the important
task of the family lawyer is to put them into their proper social con-
text, to make them acceptable as necessary evils, rather than to shun
them, only to find them back on our legal doorsteps years later. The
family lawyer must "neither be a prig on the one hand nor a conspira-
tor on the other."160 Let us hope that the judges will be able to sort
out our confused substantive law of migratory divorce, with an assist
from more enlightened legislatures. Let us hope too that lawyers will
do their part by recognizing that in family law they perform as valu-
able social engineering as they do in criminal, probate, or corporation
law, and that the grievance committees and the reviewing judges will
establish workable, just, and equal standards for all.
160
SpELAN, SuccEssFuL MANAGEmENT OF MATEMONIAL CASES 286 (1954).
